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Nondelegation and the Major Questions
Doctrine: Displacing Interpretive Power
MARLA D. TORTORICE†
INTRODUCTION
Since 1984, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, Inc. has held a prominent place in
administrative law.1 This “quasi-constitutional text”2
provides the foundation for reasonable agency deference in
the face of statutory ambiguity. While Chevron remains the
law today, and this deference to executive agencies remains
theoretically intact, the landscape of administrative law has
changed since 1984. Over time, both scholars and judges
have raised serious doubts about the rationale behind
Chevron and its consequences. One well-known critic, Justice
Neil Gorsuch, has gone as far as to accuse Chevron of being
an “abdication of the judicial duty”3 and question whether
†Law

Clerk to the Honorable D. Michael Fisher, U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit, 2019–20; Associate Attorney, Reed Smith, LLP, 2017–19; J.D.,
2017, magna cum laude, Order of the Coif, University of Pittsburgh School of
Law; B.A., 2014, summa cum laude, University of Pittsburgh. I am grateful to
George Taylor for invaluable comments and suggestions.
1. See, e.g., Michael Herz, Chevron is Dead; Long Live Chevron, 115 COLUM.
L. REV. 1867, 1872 (2015) (noting that Chevron is “the Supreme Court’s most
important decision regarding judicial deference to agency views of statutory
meaning”).
2. Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 188 (2006).
3. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1152 (10th Cir. 2016)
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the time has come to reconsider it altogether.
This Article takes a particular look at Justice Gorsuch’s
constitutional critique of the current administrative state,
which arguably is being manifested most predominantly as
the major questions doctrine in Supreme Court
jurisprudence. Justice Gorsuch, among others, argues that
the current administrative state—specifically postChevron—violates the separation of powers as the Framers
intended. Under his view, the Constitution vests the
legislature with the power to make the law, but, under
Chevron, Congress is unconstitutionally delegating too much
of that power to the executive in the form of regulatory
agencies.
While this “nondelegation” argument is one legitimate,
constitutional argument, there also exists an opposing
constitutional argument in defense of Chevron. The opposing
argument, which is also grounded in the separation of
powers, embodies the “intelligible principle” doctrine, which
states that if Congress delegates quasi-legislative powers to
another body, it must provide a “general provision” by which
“those who . . . act” can “fill up the details.”4 In other words,
Congress cannot give an agency unlimited freedom to craft
laws, but it can authorize the agency to clarify the meaning
of a law that Congress has already enacted.
Thus,
because
two
equivalent
constitutional
interpretations of Chevron exist, this Article claims that
resolution of this interpretive dispute does not rest on some
neutral place of constitutional bedrock, but instead proceeds
on the basis of the proper role of the current administrative
state. Justice Gorsuch is not engaging simply in a formalistic
interpretation of the Constitution in advocating for the
overturn of Chevron. His argument has its own policy
orientation and goals—it serves to reject the growth of the
administrative state.
(Gorsuch, J., concurring).
4. Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. 1, 43 (1825).
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The principal way that the nondelegation argument is
currently manifesting in Supreme Court jurisprudence is
through the major questions doctrine. The major questions
doctrine arises when the Court rejects Chevron deference by
arguing that Congress would not have delegated a question
of this significance to the agency. But under both
nondelegation and the major questions doctrine, the Court
claims to restrict the power of an administrative agency and
relocate lawmaking power, as required under separation of
powers, to the legislative branch. This Article demonstrates,
though, that by invoking the major questions doctrine, the
Court is, in fact, enhancing its own interpretive power.
The purpose of this Article is twofold: (1) to demonstrate
that because a dispute in the constitutional interpretation of
Chevron exists over the proper separation of powers, it is
insufficient for Justice Gorsuch to claim to rely solely on a
nondelegation argument to refute Chevron deference and (2)
to demonstrate that the major questions doctrine acts more
as a facade for the Court’s separation of power effort to
diminish administrative power. Neither of these critiques of
Chevron actually fixes the alleged problem of
unconstitutional delegations because their “remedy” is for
the Court to be the body that assumes interpretive authority.
But, under this remedy, the separation of powers is not being
restored to what the Constitution intended; the delegation is
not being restored to the legislature. Thus, the argument is
really about a policy disagreement over the role of the
administrative state, which remains in dispute. While other
scholarly articles note that the enhancement of the Court’s
own interpretive powers is one of the major questions
doctrine’s ramifications,5 this Article is distinct in the depth
5. See, e.g., Blake Emerson, Administrative Answers to Major Questions: On
the Democratic Legitimacy of Agency Statutory Interpretation, 102 MINN. L. REV.
2019, 2050 (2018) (“The major questions cases are therefore best understood as a
way to reassert the primacy of courts over agencies as the interpretive agents of
Congress.”); Lisa Heinzerling, The Power Canons, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1933,
1937 (2017) (questioning whether the major questions doctrine was intended to
serve as a “power canon” for the Court to “seiz[e] power aligned with its basic
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in which it addresses this issue and in its argument against
nondelegation as both a critique of Chevron and a rationale
of the major questions doctrine.6
Part I of this Article will provide background on Chevron,
its rationales, and the competing separation of powers
arguments both in favor of and against Chevron deference.
Part II will summarize Justice Gorsuch’s argument against
Chevron—found mainly in his Tenth Circuit GutierrezBrizuela v. Lynch concurrence, which, while not mentioning
the major questions doctrine by name, can be interpreted as
fuel for its revitalization. Part II will also outline the
emergence of the major questions doctrine in Supreme Court
jurisprudence, arguing that this doctrine is a manifestation
of the nondelegation argument and criticism of Chevron
generally. Lastly, Part III of this Article illustrates the pitfall
of Justice Gorsuch’s nondelegation argument: that by
stopping the delegation (whether improper or not), the Court
is in fact rerouting the delegation to itself, which results in
the Court doing the work of the legislator by deciding
legislative meaning as it deems proper. Part III also argues
that the major questions doctrine acts as a facade for the
Court’s nondelegation effort to diminish administrative
power, by adopting the same remedy as Justice Gorsuch’s
distrust of an active administrative state”); Kevin O. Leske, Major Questions
About the “Major Questions” Doctrine, 5 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 479, 499
(2016) (stating in the conclusion that, “when the Court applies the doctrine, it
diminishes the deference that an agency normally receives, thereby shifting
interpretive authority to the courts”); Major Question Objections, 129 HARV. L.
REV. 2191, 2202 (2016) (“[T]he [major questions] exception has sought to route
especially ‘big’ or consequential questions away from agencies and to
courts . . . .”).
6. But see Emerson, supra note 5, at 2044–45 (“Since the primary purpose of
the major questions doctrine is to reinforce the nondelegation doctrine [via the
Court’s use of substantive canons], the justification for the major questions
doctrine must be sought out in the nondelegation doctrine itself.”); Jacob Loshin
& Aaron Nielson, Hiding Nondelegation in Mouseholes, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 19, 52–
53 (2010) (same); John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon of
Avoidance, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 223, 242 (2000) (offering the under-enforced
constitutional principle of nondelegation as a rationale for the major questions
doctrine).
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argument. Therefore, what underlies these nondelegation
arguments is a policy effort to reduce the status of the
current administrative state.
I.

CHEVRON BACKGROUND

A. The Supreme Court Case: Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc.
The Supreme Court’s 1984 decision in Chevron U.S.A.,
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. has been
termed a “counter-Marbury for the administrative state,”
which stated that “in the face of ambiguity, it is emphatically
the province and duty of the administrative department to
say what the law is.”7 Chevron did this by creating a two-step
inquiry for courts to follow in reviewing agency
interpretations of law.8 Under Step One, the Court asks
whether Congress has “directly spoken to the precise
question at issue.”9 If it has, and Congress’s intent is
consequently clear, then this ends the Court’s inquiry as the
Court “must give effect to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress.”10 The Court proceeds to Step Two only if
it determines that Congress has not directly addressed the
question at issue—meaning the statute is silent—or if the
statute is ambiguous with regard to the specific issue.11
Under Step Two, rather than imposing its own construction
of the statute— as the Court would normally do in the
absence of administrative interpretation—the Court asks
whether the agency’s interpretation is a “permissible” or
reasonable construction of the statute.12 If the agency’s

7. Sunstein, supra note 2, at 189 (emphasis original).
8. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–
44 (1984).
9. Id. at 842.
10. Id. at 843.
11. Id.
12. Id.
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interpretation
is
reasonable,
then
the
agency’s
13
interpretation is controlling. Note that “reasonable” does
not mean whether, in the Court’s view, the interpretation is
how the Court would have answered the question had it been
given the task, but rather whether the agency’s
interpretation is a permissible reading of the statute,
regardless of whether the Court agrees with it.14
While Chevron framed the deference inquiry in two
steps, a third step—Step Zero—was subsequently developed
that asks whether Chevron’s two-step framework should
apply to begin with. According to Cass Sunstein, this step
was developed through a trilogy of cases,15 suggesting that
“when agencies have not exercised delegated power to act
with the force of law, a case-by-case analysis of several
factors ought to be used to determine whether Chevron
provides the governing framework.”16 Chevron Step Zero is
also commonly derived from United States v. Mead
Corporation, which held that Chevron only applies if
Congress delegated interpretive authority to the agency with
respect to the provision in question and the agency has made
an appropriate formal ruling.17 In short, Step Zero reasons
that if Chevron is based on a theory of implied delegation,
then it is reasonable to assume that there are some questions
of interpretation that Congress would not have wanted to
delegate to the agencies.
B. The Rationales Behind the Case
In promulgating Chevron’s two-step test, the Court did
13. Id. at 844.
14. Id. at 843 n.11.
15. See Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002); United States v. Mead Corp.,
533 U.S. 218 (2001); Christensen v. Harris Cty., 529 U.S. 576 (2000).
16. Sunstein, supra note 2, at 193. Step Zero is more complex than this, but
for the purposes of this Article, the above explanation suffices. See id. at 211–31
for a discussion on the cases that provide the foundation for Chevron Step Zero
and the resulting applicability of the Chevron framework.
17. Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–27.
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not provide a clear rationale behind its approach. One of the
reasons the Court gave for why agencies should be permitted
to interpret statutory ambiguities, with reasonableness as
their only limitation, was implied delegation:
The power of an administrative agency to administer a
congressionally created . . . program necessarily requires the
formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left,
implicitly or explicitly, by Congress. If Congress has explicitly left a
gap for the agency to fill, there is an express delegation of authority
to the agency to elucidate a specific provision of the statute by
regulation. . . . Sometimes the legislative delegation to an agency on
a particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case,
a court may not substitute its own construction of a statutory
provision for a reasonable interpretation made by the administrator
of an agency.18

However, this justification does not explain why a court
should find an implicit delegation to the agency, either on the
basis of the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) or the
Clear Air Act, which provided the governing statutory
provisions in Chevron.19 The APA, on the contrary, states
that the “reviewing court shall decide all relevant questions
of law, [and] interpret . . . statutory provisions,”20 suggesting
that ambiguities must be resolved by the court. This has led
many Supreme Court Justices and scholars to draw the
conclusion that implied delegation is merely a legal fiction.21
18. Chevron, 467 U.S at 843–44 (citations omitted) (quoting Morton v. Ruiz,
415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)).
19. Sunstein, supra note 2, at 196.
20. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
21. See e.g., Scott H. Angstreich, Shoring Up Chevron: A Defense of Seminole
Rock Deference to Agency Regulatory Interpretations, 34 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 49, 91
(2000) (“Insofar as Chevron instructs lower courts to treat a statutory ambiguity
as an implicit delegation of interpretive authority, it is widely understood to rest
on a fiction.”); David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation
Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 224 (citing Breyer’s observation on the fiction
of Chevron); Kurt Eggert, Deference and Fiction: Reforming Chevron’s Legal
Fictions After King v. Burwell, 95 NEB. L. REV. 702, 719 (2017) (“The Chevron
opinion, however, rests on the legal fiction that Congress, by leaving a gap or
ambiguity in a statute, evinces an intent to delegate to the administering agency
the power to fill in that gap.”); Herz, supra note 1, at 1876 (“But it is hard to find
anyone who does not consider congressional delegation a fiction.”); John F.
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Indeed, both Justice Stephen Breyer and Justice Antonin
Scalia wrote separate law review articles in the 1980s
discussing this implication of delegation as an important
legal fiction newly created by the Supreme Court in
Chevron.22
The Court in Chevron also provided two additional policy
reasons to justify deference: agency expertise and political
accountability. The Court noted that “[j]udges are not
experts in the field”23 and “[w]hile agencies are not directly
accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is
entirely appropriate for this political branch of the
Government to make such policy choices—resolving the
competing interests which Congress itself either
inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be
resolved by the agency charged with the administration of
the statute in light of everyday realities.”24
The debate about how to understand Chevron’s rationale
continues to this day, with scholars both returning to the
original justifications such as implied delegation, agency
expertise, and political accountability, and also appraising
new ones like uniformity.25 Jonathan Adler makes a

Manning, Inside Congress’s Mind, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 1932 (2015) (“Yet
whatever the background legislative understanding about deference and
delegation may once have been, it would be facetious for judges today to treat the
availability of deference as a question of genuine legislative intent.”).
22. Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38
ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 370 (1986). See Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to
Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 517.
23. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865.
24. Id. at 865–66.
25. See Jonathan Adler, Restoring Chevron’s Domain, 81 MO. L. REV. 983,
987–89 (2016) (“Empowering agencies to offer authoritative interpretations of
ambiguous federal laws also serves the goal of uniformity within the federal
system. If federal law is federal law, it should apply uniformly throughout the
nation. Leaving the interpretation of ambiguous or unclear statutes to the courts
can result in different interpretations applying in different places (at least until
the Supreme Court resolves such questions, should it choose to do so). A federal
agency interpretation to which courts are obliged to defer, on the other hand,
provides for a single nationwide interpretation of the relevant statute.”).

2019]

DISPLACING INTERPRETIVE POWER

1083

distinction between these types of rationales. He points out
that agency expertise, political accountability, and
uniformity are all policy reasons for deferring to agencies
over judges.26 But Chevron needed a legal basis as well,
especially when one considers the fact that the
Administrative Procedure Act essentially states the opposite
rule: that it is courts that are to “decide all relevant questions
of law,” which includes the meaning of “statutory
provisions.”27 Despite the lack of a statutory provision that
instructs the courts to defer to agency interpretations in
cases of ambiguous statutory texts, the Supreme Court, on
numerous occasions, has noted that Chevron is premised on
a delegation of interpretive power from Congress to executive
agencies.28 This is what is meant by implied delegation.
Implied delegation is, in fact, rooted in the Constitution.
It is a function of the exclusive allocation of legislative
authority to Congress in Article I.29 However, because few
statutes explicitly provide for this delegation, the rationale
that Congress intends each ambiguity as a delegation of
authority is considered by most to be a “legal fiction.”30 But
if it is a legal fiction, it is a widely accepted one, and one that

26. Id. at 989.
27. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
28. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2488 (2015) (Chevron “is premised on
the theory that a statute’s ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation from
Congress to the agency to fill in the statutory gaps.”); FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159 (2000) (same); United States v.
Mead Corp. 533 U.S. 218, 226–27, 229 (2001) (recognizing that the delegation of
authority may be implicit); see also Adler, supra note 25, at 990–91.
29. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be
vested in a Congress of the United States . . . .”).
30. Adler, supra note 25, at 990–91; see also Lisa Schulz Bressman,
Reclaiming the Legal Fiction of Congressional Delegation, 97 VA. L. REV. 2009,
2009 (2011) (noting Chevron “rests on a legal fiction”); Herz, supra note 1, at 1876
(“[I]t is hard to find anyone who does not consider congressional delegation a
fiction.”); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Why Deference?: Implied Delegations,
Agency Expertise, and the Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 735,
749 (2002) (“Chevron deference revolves around the fiction of a congressional
delegation . . . .”).
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provides the basis for Chevron’s legal foundation. As Justice
Scalia remarked in a 1989 article:
Chevron . . . replaced [a] statute-by-statute evaluation . . . with an
across-the-board presumption that, in the case of ambiguity, agency
discretion is meant . . . . Surely, [this] is a more rational
presumption today than it would have been thirty years ago—which
explains the change in the law. Broad delegation to the Executive
is the hallmark of the modern administrative state; agency
rulemaking powers are the rule rather than, as they once were, the
exception; and as the sheer number of modern departments and
agencies suggests, we are awash in agency “expertise.” . . . In the
vast majority of cases I expect that Congress . . . didn’t think about
the matter at all . . . [which means] any rule adopted in this field
represents merely a fictional, presumed intent, and operates
principally as a background rule of law against which Congress can
legislate.31

C. The Competing Constitutional Interpretations of Chevron
There exist two competing constitutional interpretations
of Chevron. Both concern the proper separation of powers
and arise out of the historical development of the
nondelegation doctrine. What this Article terms the
“nondelegation argument” more closely aligns with the
traditional nondelegation doctrine, which represents the
reluctance in the 1930s to expand the powers of the federal
government. Advocates for a reduction of Chevron deference
and the administrative state in general use this
nondelegation argument. On the contrary, those who
advocate for maintaining the current administrative state
use the “intelligible principle argument,” which represents a
willingness after the 1930s to accommodate legislative
delegations given the increasing difficulties of governing a

31. Scalia, supra note 22, at 516–17. Justice Scalia goes on to state that “[i]f
that is the principal function to be served, Chevron is unquestionably better than
what preceded it” because (1) “Congress now knows that the ambiguity it
creates . . . will be resolved within the bounds of permissible interpretation . . . by
a particular agency, whose policy biases will ordinarily be known”; and (2)
Chevron “permit[s] needed flexibility, and appropriate political participation, in
the administrative process.” Id. at 517.

2019]

DISPLACING INTERPRETIVE POWER

1085

growing nation.32 This gave way to a modification of the
traditional
nondelegation
doctrine,
equating
constitutionality with the presence of an “intelligible
principle” from Congress.
Those favoring a reduction in the current administrative
state use the nondelegation argument. The traditional
nondelegation doctrine states: “That Congress cannot
delegate legislative power to the President is a principle
universally recognized as vital to the integrity and
maintenance of the system of government ordained by the
Constitution.”33 This is because Article I of the Constitution
vests all legislative power in Congress. According to the
nondelegation argument’s advocates, Justice Gorsuch among
them, the nondelegation doctrine has an essential connection
to separation of powers and individual liberty.34 This position
emphasizes more the “separation” in the separation of
powers. It is a more literal understanding of the structure of
the Constitution and of the APA (which requires that courts
“decide all relevant questions of law” and “interpret
constitutional and statutory provisions”),35 as well as
Marbury v. Madison’s enunciation of judicial duty.36

32. For a discussion on the judicial history of the nondelegation doctrine, see
Patrick M. Garry, Accommodating the Administrative State: The
Interrelationship Between the Chevron and Nondelegation Doctrines, 38 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 921, 928–933 (2006).
33. Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892); see also Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361, 371–72 (1989) (“Congress generally cannot delegate its
legislative power to another [b]ranch.”).
34. DOT v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1237, 1241 (2015) (“The
principle that Congress cannot delegate away its vested powers exists to protect
liberty.”) (Alito, J., concurring) (“At issue in this case is the proper division
between legislative and executive powers. An examination of the history of those
powers reveals how far our modern separation-of-powers jurisprudence has
departed from the original meaning of the Constitution.”) (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
35. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012) (outlining the standards by which a court should
determine the validity of an agency action in reviewing its proceedings).
36. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).
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As applied here, the nondelegation argument is that
Congress’s delegation of authority to executive agencies
under Chevron is unconstitutional because Congress is
delegating too much of its constitutional power to the
executive. The major questions doctrine, then, is one way for
the Court to remedy these unconstitutional delegations, as it
stops them in cases of significant questions.
On the other hand, those in favor of maintaining the
current administrative state use the intelligible principle
argument: that as long as Congress has supplied something
like an “intelligible principle” to guide and limit executive
discretion, delegations of power are constitutional.37
Notably, what is considered a permissible intelligible
principle can be very broad and vague. For example, in
Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, Inc., the Court
held that the language “requisite to protect the public
health” contained a sufficient intelligible principle to guide
the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) in setting air
quality standards.38 This finding follows a long line of
precedent in which broad and vague terms are still held as
containing an intelligible principle.39
So while the nondelegation argument emphasizes more
the separation in the separation of powers, the intelligible

37. The intelligible principle doctrine can be originally attributed to J. W.
Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, a 1928 case, where the Court upheld
Congress’s delegation to the President to set tariff rates that would equalize
production costs in the United States and competing countries. See J. W.
Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928). There, the Court
emphasized the importance of seeking the cooperation of another branch of
government, and in doing so, Congress was only restrained by the “common sense
and the inherent necessities” of the situation. Id. at 406. The Court stated it
would uphold delegations as long as Congress provided an “intelligible principle”
to which the President or an agency must comply. Id. at 409 (“If Congress shall
lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body
authorized to fix such rates is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a
forbidden delegation of legislative power.”).
38. See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 475–76 (2001).
39. See, e.g., Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. Petroleum Inst. (Benzene), 448 U.S.
607, 612 (1980); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989).
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principle argument emphasizes instead the principle that
the separation of powers also works to permit coordination of
powers, in order to allow government to function effectively.
For instance, Buckley v. Valeo embodies this principle when
it cites prior precedent on the subject of the three branches
of government as “co-ordinate parts of one government,”
stating that one branch may seek assistance from another
“according to common sense and the inherent necessities of
the government co-ordination.”40 The separation of powers
contemplates “that practice will integrate the dispersed
powers into a workable government.”41 Chief Justice Roberts
also emphasizes this principle in Burwell by discussing the
Court’s role in ensuring government workability rather than
insisting on more literal understandings that defeat the
government design.42 Those in favor of the intelligible
principle argument would argue that the nondelegation
argument, and its literal interpretation of the separation of
powers, makes government unworkable, but making
government unworkable is precisely its goal.
Thus, the intelligible principle argument, in contrast to
the nondelegation argument, is grounded more in something
akin to constitutional realism rather than legal formalism,

40. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976) (quoting Hampton & Co. v. United
States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928)).
41. Id. (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635
(1952)).
42. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2496 (2015).
In a democracy, the power to make the law rests with those chosen by
the people. Our role is more confined—“to say what the law is.” Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 1 Cranch 137, 177, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803). That is
easier in some cases than in others. But in every case we must respect
the role of the Legislature, and take care not to undo what it has done.
A fair reading of legislation demands a fair understanding of the
legislative plan. Congress passed the Affordable Care Act to improve
health insurance markets, not to destroy them. If at all possible, we must
interpret the Act in a way that is consistent with the former, and avoids
the latter. Section 36B can fairly be read consistent with what we see as
Congress’s plan, and that is the reading we adopt.
Id. (Roberts, J., writing for the majority).
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recognizing the realities of the traditional nondelegation
doctrine. Even though scholars and judges continue to use
the nondelegation argument to make a case against Chevron,
there have only been two decisions invalidating an agency
action as unconstitutional on nondelegation grounds.43 Both
decisions were in 1935, one of which “provided literally no
guidance for the exercise of discretion, and the other of which
conferred authority to regulate the entire economy on the
basis of no more precise a standard than stimulating the
economy by assuring ‘fair competition.’”44 Many scholars
attribute the reason for the lack of the nondelegation
doctrine’s enforcement, despite the many opportunities for
the Court to do so, to its impossibility of being judicially
administered in a principled way.45 Justice Scalia stated in
Whitman that “we have ‘almost never felt qualified to secondguess Congress regarding the permissible degree of policy
judgment that can be left to those executing or applying the
law.’”46
As Professor John Manning has summarized:
“[E]nforcement of the nondelegation doctrine necessarily
reduces to the question whether a statute confers too much
discretion. Without a reliable metric (other than an I-knowit-when-I-see-it test), the Court has long doubted its capacity
to make principled judgments about such questions of
43. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935);
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
44. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001) (citing
Panama Refining Co., 293 U.S. at 388; A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp., 295 U.S.
at 495).
45. See e.g., Cass Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 321
(2000) (“[J]udicial enforcement of the nondelegation doctrine would raise serious
problems of judicial competence and would greatly magnify the role of the
judiciary in overseeing the operation of modern government. Because the
relevant questions are ones of degree, the nondelegation doctrine could not be
administered in anything like a rule-bound way, and hence the nondelegation
doctrine is likely, in practice, to violate its own aspirations to discretion-free
law.”); Loshin & Nielson, supra note 6, at 57.
46. Whitman, 531 U.S. at 474–75 (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488
U.S. 361, 416 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
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degree.”47 The traditional nondelegation doctrine largely
failed as a constitutional matter. Nonetheless, the
nondelegation argument appears to have been resurrected as
a doctrine of statutory interpretation.
This Article will primarily focus on the nondelegation
argument because this is the argument used by critics of
Chevron, particularly Justice Gorsuch. The nondelegation
argument often provides the justification that Justice
Gorsuch and proponents of the major questions doctrine use
to argue that Chevron deference should be scaled back.
Nevertheless, it is essential to appreciate that both the
nondelegation argument and the intelligible principle are
viable separation of powers arguments that concern the
proper constitutional interpretation of Chevron. Deciding
which of these constitutional visions one aligns with usually
depends upon one’s policy preference on the status of the
current administrative state.
II. CHEVRON CRITICISM
Chevron has drawn much criticism. Many judges and
scholars reject the intelligible principle argument and the
“legal fiction” of implied delegation. They believe that an
ambiguity in a statute does not reflect a congressional intent
for agencies to fill in the gaps,48 and such delegations are a
violation of the separation of powers. Indeed, under these
views, it is the Court’s function to resolve legislative
meanings. This Part focuses on Justice Gorsuch’s
nondelegation argument against Chevron deference and the
major questions doctrine as a manifestation of that criticism
against Chevron.
A. Justice Gorsuch’s Argument
One of the more well-known critics of the Chevron

47. Manning, supra note 6, at 241–42.
48. See Garry, supra note 32, at 945–46.
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doctrine is now-Justice Gorsuch. As previously mentioned,
one of his main arguments is that Chevron is contrary to the
separation of powers as the Framers intended. He penned
this critique when he was still sitting on the Tenth Circuit in
an opinion titled Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch.49 The majority
opinion, which he also wrote, is important as it addresses the
interplay between judicial and agency interpretations under
both Chevron and Brand X.50 However, Justice Gorsuch’s
separate concurrence is even more vital for the purposes of
this Article because it is there that Justice Gorsuch focuses
on the nondelegation argument, all but calling for the
Supreme Court to overturn Chevron.
1. Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch Majority Opinion
The intricate question before the Tenth Circuit in
Gutierrez-Brizuela was: “[A]ccepting that an agency may
overrule a court, may it do so not only prospectively but also
retroactively, applying its new rule to completed conduct
that transpired at a time when the contrary judicial
precedent appeared to control?”51 Writing for the majority,
Justice Gorsuch held that an agency’s interpretation is not
“legally effective” until a court, in deference to the agency,
overrules itself.52
Gutierrez-Brizuela
dealt
with
two
seemingly
contradictory provisions of U.S. immigration law. The first
statute “grants the Attorney General discretion to ‘adjust the
status’ of those who have entered the country illegally and
afford them lawful residency.”53 The second statute “provides
that certain persons who have entered this country illegally
49. See Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016)
(Gorsuch, J., concurring).
50. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967
(2005).
51. Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1143.
52. Id. at 1145.
53. 8 U.S.C. § 1255(i)(2) (2012); Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1144 (citing
De Niz Robles v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1165, 1167 (10th Cir. 2015)).
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more than once are categorically prohibited from winning
lawful residency . . . unless they first serve a ten-year
waiting period outside our borders.”54 In 2005, the Tenth
Circuit determined that the first statute should control.55
Padilla-Caldera v. Gonzales (Padilla-Caldera I) held that
the Attorney General’s discretion to afford relief without
insisting on a decade-long waiting period remained intact.56
However, in 2007, the Board of Immigration Appeals
(“BIA”) issued In re Briones.57 In Briones, the BIA decided
that as a matter of policy discretion the statutory tension
should be resolved against affording the Attorney General
any discretion to consider applications for adjustment of
status when the second statute applies.58 The BIA sought to
apply this new rule—holding that the second statute
controls—in Padilla-Caldera II.59 There, the Tenth Circuit
held that “the Supreme Court’s extension of Chevron in
Brand X further required this court to defer to the agency’s
policy choice and overrule our own governing statutory
interpretation in Padilla-Caldera I.”60
Unfortunately, that was not the end of the court’s
recitation of relevant procedural history. The BIA tried to
make its In re Briones ruling retroactive in a case titled De

54. 8 U.S.C § 1182(a)(9)(C)(i)(I); Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1144 (citing
De Niz Robles, 803 F.3d at 1167)).
55. Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1144 (citing Padilla-Caldera v. Gonzales
(Padilla-Caldera I), 426 F.3d 1294, 1299–1301 (10th Cir. 2005), amended and
superseded on reh’g by 453 F.3d 1237, 1242–44 (10th Cir. 2006)).
56. Id.
57. Id. (citing In re Briones, 24 I. & N. Dec. 355 (BIA 2007)).
58. Id. (citing In re Briones, 24 I. & N. Dec. 355 (BIA 2007)).
59. Id.
60. Id. (citing Padilla-Caldera v. Holder (Padilla-Caldera II), 637 F.3d 1140,
1148–52 (10th Cir. 2011)). The Tenth Circuit engaged in a Chevron analysis,
finding that the “two statutory directives were ambiguous [and] that ‘step two’ of
Chevron required this court to assume that Congress had delegated legislative
authority to the BIA to make a ‘reasonable’ policy choice in the face of this
statutory ambiguity.” Id. (citing Padilla–Caldera II, 637 F.3d at 1148–52).
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Niz Robles,61 and the Tenth Circuit quite simply said “no.”
Both bodies agreed that after Padilla-Caldera II all future
petitioners must satisfy the ten-year waiting period and not
seek discretionary relief from the Attorney General.62 But De
Niz Robles applied to a petitioner who applied for
discretionary relief in express reliance on Padilla-Caldera I,
before the BIA’s announcement of its contrary interpretation
in Briones.63 The Tenth Circuit held that “because the
agency’s promulgation of a new rule of general applicability
under Chevron step two and Brand X is an exercise of
delegated legislative policymaking authority, it is subject to
the presumption of prospectivity that attends true exercises
of legislative authority.”64
Finally arriving to the case before it in 2016—GutierrezBrizuela—the BIA tried again to bring a similar claim. Mr.
Gutierrez-Brizuela, like Mr. De Niz Robles, applied for
adjustment of status in reliance on the court’s decision in
Padilla-Caldera I.65 The difference is that Mr. GutierrezBrizuela applied for relief during the period after the BIA’s
announcement of its contrary interpretation in Briones but
before Padilla-Caldera II declared Briones controlling and
Padilla-Caldera I overruled.66 The BIA argued that this
distinction made “all the legal difference.” 67 But the Tenth
Circuit disagreed.68
Justice Gorsuch wrote that Mr. Gutierrez-Brizuela was
eligible for adjusted status because Padilla-Caldera I—and
not Briones or Padilla-Caldera II—controlled his 2009

61. De Niz Robles v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1165 (10th Cir. 2015).
62. Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1144.
63. Id.
64. Id. (citing De Niz Robles, 803 F.3d at 1172–74).
65. Id.
66. Id. at 1144–45.
67. Id. at 1145.
68. Id.
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application for adjusted status.69 This was because of both
the rule and the reasoning in De Niz Robles v. Lynch.70
The court first discussed the rule in De Niz Robles, which
was: “An agency in the Chevron step two/Brand X scenario
may enforce its new policy judgment only with judicial
approval.”71 The BIA depended on Padilla-Caldera II (a
Tenth Circuit Court opinion) to render Briones (a BIA
opinion) effective. Why? Because the court had to “discharge
its obligation under Chevron step two and Brand X to
determine that the statutory provisions at issue were indeed
ambiguous [and] that the BIA’s interpretation of them was
indeed reasonable.”72
Then, the court turned to De Niz Robles’ reasoning: “[T]o
the extent the executive is permitted to exercise delegated
legislative authority to overrule judicial decisions, logic
suggests it should be bound by the same presumption of
prospectivity that attends true legislative enactments.”73 If
Congress, for example, wanted to amend the law to dismiss
a judicial decision such as Padilla-Caldera I, its actions
would have controlled conduct arising only after the
legislation went into effect. In this case, we know that
Briones only went into effect when the Tenth Circuit handed
down Padilla-Caldera II.74 Thus, individuals were free to
rely on Padilla-Caldera I.75
In sum, focusing on a court’s obligation to find whether
the relevant statutory provision is ambiguous and, if it is,
whether the agency’s interpretation is reasonable, GuiterrezBrizuela v. Lynch held that an agency’s interpretation must
69. Id. at 1144–45.
70. Id. at 1145; De Niz Robles v. Lynch, 803 F.3d 1165 (10th Cir. 2015).
71. Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1145 (quoting De Niz Robles, 803 F.3d at
1174).
72. Id.
73. Id. (citing De Niz Robles, 803 F.3d at 1172).
74. Id.
75. Id.
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wait for a court’s approval. In other words, an agency’s
interpretation is not “legally effective” until a court, in
deference to the agency, overrules itself.
2.

Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch Concurrence

Clearly believing that Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch
demonstrated fundamental problems with the Chevron
doctrine, Justice Gorsuch took the opportunity to write a
separate concurring opinion. His opening remarks set the
overall tone of the concurrence: “[T]he fact is Chevron and
Brand X permit executive bureaucracies to swallow huge
amounts of core judicial and legislative power and
concentrate federal power in a way that seems more than a
little difficult to square with the Constitution of the framers’
design. Maybe the time has come to face the behemoth.”76
For the purposes of this Article, I will break down Justice
Gorsuch’s relevant concerns regarding Chevron into two
categories, both of which relate to the separation of powers.
Justice Gorsuch argues that Chevron and Brand X are
contrary to the separation of powers intended by the framers
of the Constitution both by (1) depriving the judiciary of its
proper role (the “abdication of judicial duty argument”) and
(2) relinquishing excessive legislative authority to the
executive (the “nondelegation argument”).77 It is the second

76. Id. at 1149 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
77. Id. at 1154 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). Justice Gorsuch has a third, related
argument that Chevron makes it considerably more difficult for “the people” to
discern what the law is:
Under Chevron the people aren’t just charged with awareness of and the
duty to conform their conduct to the fairest reading of the law that a
detached magistrate can muster. Instead, they are charged with an
awareness of Chevron; required to guess whether the statute will be
declared “ambiguous” (courts often disagree on what qualifies); and
required to guess (again) whether an agency’s interpretation will be
deemed “reasonable.” Who can even attempt all that, at least without an
army of perfumed lawyers and lobbyists? And, of course, that’s not the
end of it. Even if the people somehow manage to make it through this
far unscathed, they must always remain alert to the possibility that the
agency will reverse its current view 180 degrees anytime based merely
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argument that is the focus of this Article.
First, as to the abdication of judicial duty argument,
Justice Gorsuch states that Chevron and Brand X prevent
courts from fulfilling their constitutional and statutory duty,
under the APA, to say what the law is. Justice Gorsuch starts
by discussing Brand X’s tension with the separation of
powers: “By Brand X’s own telling . . . a judicial declaration
of the law’s meaning in a case or controversy before it is not
‘authoritative,’ but is instead subject to revision by a
politically accountable branch of government.”78 This is, after
all, precisely what had happened to Justice Gorsuch in the
case of Mr. Padilla-Caldera. After the Tenth Circuit had
declared the immigration statutes’ meaning and issued its
holding, “an executive agency was permitted to (and did) tell
us to reverse our decision like some sort of super court of
appeals.”79 Justice Gorsuch stated that “[i]f that doesn’t
qualify as an unconstitutional revision of a judicial
declaration of the law by a political branch, I confess I begin
to wonder whether we’ve forgotten what might.”80
Justice Gorsuch continued with what he believed the
proper solution should have been. Instead of the agency
being able to change the law: “When the political branches
disagree with a judicial interpretation of existing law, the
Constitution prescribes the appropriate remedial process.
It’s called legislation. Admittedly, the legislative process can
be an arduous one. But that’s no bug in the constitutional

on the shift of political winds and still prevail. Neither, too, will agencies
always deign to announce their views in advance; often enough they seek
to impose their “reasonable” new interpretations only retroactively in
administrative adjudications.
Id. at 1152.
78. Id. at 1150 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
79. Id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (citing Padilla-Caldera v. Gonzales (PadillaCaldera I), 426 F.3d 1294 (10th Cir. 2005), amended and superseded on reh’g by
453 F.3d 1237 (10th Cir. 2006)).
80. Id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
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design: it is the very point of the design.”81 Then, Justice
Gorsuch came to the heart of the issue. “Of course, Brand X
asserts that its rule about judicial deference to executive
revisions follows logically ‘from Chevron itself’ . . . . But
acknowledging this much only brings the colossus now fully
into view.”82 Justice Gorsuch’s problem is ultimately not with
Brand X, but with Chevron deference itself.
Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence also cited to the APA to
further his critique of the abdication of judicial duty
argument. Section 706 of the APA outlines the standards by
which a court should determine the validity of an agency
action in reviewing its proceedings.83 Section 706 requires
that courts “decide all relevant questions of law” and
“interpret constitutional and statutory provisions.”84 Yet,
according to Justice Gorsuch, the APA is not being followed:
“[R]ather than completing the task expressly assigned to us,
rather
than
‘interpret[ing] . . . statutory
provisions,’
declaring what the law is, and overturning inconsistent
agency action, Chevron step two tells us we must allow an
executive agency to resolve the meaning of any ambiguous
statutory provision. In this way, Chevron seems no less than
a judge-made doctrine for the abdication of the judicial
duty.”85
Justice Gorsuch’s reliance on the APA is an example of
another formalist argument—as opposed to acknowledging
the legal realism of the courts adjusting to the complexities
of the existing administrative state. However, once again,
this argument is not simply formalistic; it serves to reject the
growth of the administrative state.

81. Id. at 1151 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
82. Id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
83. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012).
84. Id.; Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1151 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (citing
5 U.S.C. § 706 (2012)).
85. Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1151–52 (Gorsuch, J., concurring)
(emphasis added).
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Turning to Justice Gorsuch’s second argument against
Chevron, the “nondelegation argument,” Justice Gorsuch
argues that the amount of interpretive authority that
Chevron vests in agencies violates the traditional
nondelegation doctrine. Recall that the traditional
nondelegation doctrine has as its opposite the intelligible
principle argument, and that the intelligible principle
argument assumes that Congress delegated enough of an
intelligible principle in order to make Chevron deference
constitutional in the majority of cases. Justice Gorsuch seeks
to respond to the intelligible principle argument and the
implied delegation rationale for Chevron by writing:
“Chevron says that we should infer from any statutory
ambiguity Congress’s ‘intent’ to ‘delegate’ its ‘legislative
authority’ to the executive to make ‘reasonable’ policy
choices,”86 but this delegation to the executive branch is
merely implied,87 while, by contrast, an express delegation to
the courts exists. Citing to the APA again, Justice Gorsuch
writes that “Congress expressly vested the courts with the
responsibility to ‘interpret . . . statutory provisions’ and
overturn
agency
action
inconsistent
with
those
interpretations.”88 Couple this with the fact that “not a word
can be found here about delegating legislative authority to
agencies,” and “how can anyone fairly say that Congress
‘intended’ for courts to abdicate their statutory duty under
§ 706 and instead ‘intended’ to delegate away its legislative
power to executive agencies?”89
Justice Gorsuch invokes the nondelegation argument
86. Id. at 1153 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat.
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984)).
87. Id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (“But where exactly has Congress expressed
this intent?”).
88. Id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706).
89. Id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring). Justice Gorsuch then admits that “Chevron’s
claim about legislative intentions is no more than a fiction.” Id. Many judges and
legal scholars agree that this claim is a legal fiction, but accept it nonetheless
because, among other advantages, it provides the background rule of law against
which Congress can legislate. See supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text.
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when he takes his argument a step further. Justice Gorsuch
writes that, assuming for the sake of argument that
Congress did delegate its legislative authority to executive
agencies under Chevron, the question then becomes
“can Congress really delegate its legislative authority—its
power to write new rules of general applicability—to
executive agencies?”90
Justice Gorsuch’s gut reaction is to answer no, Congress
cannot delegate its legislative authority to executive
agencies, even though Chevron’s essential purpose is to
“delegate legislative power to the executive branch.”91
Importantly, he concedes that the law in “recent times”
involves the rule of the “intelligible principle,” which, in his
words, means that the Court has “suggested” that “Congress
may allow the executive to make new rules of general
applicability that look a great deal like legislation, so long as
the controlling legislation contains an ‘intelligible principle’
that ‘clearly delineates the general policy’ the agency is to
apply and ‘the boundaries of [its] delegated authority.’”92
“This means Congress must at least ‘provide substantial
guidance on setting . . . standards that affect the entire
national economy.’”93
Yet, nondelegation remains a problem for Justice
Gorsuch: “But even taking the forgiving intelligible principle
test as a given, it’s no small question whether Chevron can

90. Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1153 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (reminding
the readers of Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892), for the proposition that
“[t]he Supreme Court has long recognized that under the Constitution ‘Congress
cannot delegate legislative power to the president’ and that this ‘principle [is]
universally recognized as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of
government ordained by the constitution.’”).
91. Id. at 1154 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
92. Id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (citing Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S.
361, 372–73 (1989) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
93. Id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (citing Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’n, 531
U.S. 457, 475 (2001)).
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clear it.”94 Justice Gorsuch does not believe that the requisite
substantial guidance exists when an agency has the power to
“enact a new rule of general applicability affecting huge
swaths of the national economy one day and reverse itself the
next.”95 Citing to the 1935 Schechter decision, Justice
Gorsuch writes that “[t]he Supreme Court once unanimously
declared that a statute affording the executive the power to
write an industrial code of competition for the poultry
industry violated the separation of powers. And if that’s the
case, you might ask how is it that Chevron—a rule that
invests agencies with pretty unfettered power to regulate a
lot more than chicken—can evade the chopping block.”96
Justice Gorsuch’s main concern seems to be that an
administrative agency’s ability under Chevron and Brand X
to “set and revise policy (legislative), override adverse
judicial determinations (judicial), and exercise enforcement
discretion (executive)” has created an administrative state
that can supersede any branch of the government.97 At the
end of his concurrence, Justice Gorsuch asks, “what would
happen in a world without Chevron?”98 In practice, his
answer is not much, but in principle, a return to pre-Chevron
administrative law would restore the proper constitutional
arrangement and the rule-of-law protections it was meant to
secure.99 Justice Gorsuch’s resolution would be to overturn
Chevron or, in the very least, afford less deference to agencies
under Chevron.100

94. Id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
95. Id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
96. Id. at 1155 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) (citing A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537–42 (1935)).
97. Id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
98. Id. at 1158 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
99. See id. (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
100. Scholar Eric Citron raises the interesting argument that “Gorsuch’s two
best-known decisions on administrative law—Gutierrez-Brizuela and De Niz
Robles v. Lynch—both involve one of the weakest possible contexts in which to
defend Chevron doctrine.” By this Citron means that because the administrative
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While Justice Gorsuch raises a good separation of powers
point in criticizing the ability, post-Brand X, for agencies to
effectively overrule a court, this is distinguishable from his
objections to Chevron generally and from the major questions
doctrine. The major questions doctrine has been invoked to
remove agency deference in situations not when there has
been an executive revision of a court’s rule, but in cases of
first impression for both the court and the agency. For
example, in Brown & Williamson, which will be discussed in
more detail later, the Court invoked the major questions
doctrine so that the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”)
was not the entity that interpreted whether or not tobacco
was a drug within the meaning of the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”).101 Similarly, in King v. Burwell,
the Court invoked the major questions doctrine so that the
Internal Revenue Service (“IRS”) was not the entity that
interpreted whether tax credits were available on State
Exchanges.102 In the same vein, Justice Gorsuch’s
agency at issue in both cases was the Board of Immigration Appeals—“the
primary function of which is just to decide the host of quasi-judicial immigration
cases that must be adjudicated throughout the nation”—“no real issue of
technical judgment or agency expertise” was involved. “Gorsuch’s next bestknown administrative law decision shares this feature.” United States v. Nichols,
784 F.3d 666, (10th Cir. 2015), similarly involved “the power of a non-technical
administrator (the attorney general) to create retroactive effects on individuals,”
this time, involving the interpretation of a criminal statute. Citron argues that
this exposure is different than the agencies commonplace in D.C. that were the
reason behind Chevron:
The core case for Chevron thus comes from big policy statutes that
broadly create or empower federal agencies with technical expertise—
statutes like the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act (EPA); the Federal
Communications Act (Federal Communications Commission); the
Federal Power Act and Natural Gas Act (Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission); the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (Food and Drug
Administration); or the Occupational Safety and Health Act
(Occupational Safety and Health Administration).
Eric Citron, The roots and limits of Gorsuch’s views on Chevron deference,
SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 17, 2017, 11:26 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2017/
03/roots-limits-gorsuchs-views-chevron-deference/.
101. See infra notes 131–43 and accompanying text.
102. See infra notes 169–206 and accompanying text.
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underlying concern with and real objection to Chevron—that
he believes the Court should be the entity to answer the
question to begin with—is not quite the same as believing
that an agency should not be able to overrule a court.
This Article returns and responds to Justice Gorsuch’s
nondelegation argument in Part III. But first, it is important
to examine the major questions doctrine because, despite not
explicitly mentioning the major questions doctrine, Justice
Gorsuch’s concurrence could easily be considered fuel for its
use in Supreme Court jurisprudence.103 The major questions
doctrine is often phrased as an “exception” to Chevron
deference. Scholars have argued that the major questions
doctrine is a new way for the Court to handle what it
perceives as unconstitutional delegations by Congress.104
While, at the moment, the doctrine seems to be reserved for
only the most “extraordinary”105 of cases, its resurgence,
fueled by critics of Chevron who are now sitting on the bench,
may signal a more prevalent place for its use.
B. Major Questions Doctrine as a Manifestation of Chevron
Criticism
In addition to Chevron being a continuous subject of
debate among judges and scholars, the Court itself has
reshaped the doctrine over the years since its inception.
103. Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence was published in 2015, as was the decision
in King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
104. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. and Philip P. Frickey, QuasiConstitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45
VAND. L. REV. 593, 630–31 (1992) (arguing that many of the substantive canons,
such as nondelegation, are judicial efforts to give vitality to under-enforced
constitutional norms); Loshin & Nielson, supra note 6, at 20–21, 53 (“Although
the Court has effectively given up policing the nondelegation doctrine directly,
the Court is still concerned about agencies making important policy choices. So
the Court has attempted to craft a new canon of statutory construction to
minimize what it perceives to be excessive delegation. . . . Accordingly, while not
striking down statutes under the nondelegation doctrine, the Court has
nonetheless wielded the elephants-in-mouseholes doctrine to limit delegations of
authority.”).
105. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. at 2488–89.
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Among the additions to the original Chevron doctrine106 is
the exception for a class of cases for which Chevron deference
does not apply at all. First established in the 1990s, this is
the major questions doctrine. The major questions doctrine
has manifested in the Court for the same reasons that
Justice Gorsuch has criticized Chevron. Both criticize the
rule of deference to administrative decision making.
In an effort to rein in Chevron deference in certain cases
and re-establish judicial authority, the major questions
doctrine arises when an agency acts based on its
interpretation of the statute in question, and the reviewing
court rejects deference to the agency’s interpretation that
would otherwise be available under Chevron by pointing to
the significance of the question involved. The most recent,
well-known occurrence of the major questions doctrine is in
King v. Burwell, in which the Court upheld an Affordable
Care Act regulation promulgated by the IRS—not by
granting the IRS deference, but by stating that Chevron was
wholly inapplicable and interpreting the statutory ambiguity
for itself.107 The Court stated it was able to do this because
the question was one of “deep ‘economic and political
significance’”108 and “[h]ad Congress wished to assign that
question to an agency, it surely would have done so
expressly.”109
The most simple iteration of the major questions doctrine
is that in questions involving “deep ‘economic and political
significance’” the Court will not defer to an agency’s

106. One example is adding Step Zero in Mead. See United States v. Mead
Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001). Another, arguably, is Chevron Step One-AndA-Half. See Daniel J. Hemel and Aaron L. Nielson, Chevron Step One-And-AHalf, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 757, 757 (2017) (arguing that an intermediate step
between Chevron Steps One and Two exists, which asks: “Did the agency
recognize that the statutory provision is ambiguous?”).
107. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. at 2488–89.
108. Id. at 2489 (quoting Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA (UARG), 573 U.S.
302, 324 (2014)).
109. Id. (quoting UARG, 573 U.S. at 324).
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interpretation unless Congress has explicitly stated so.110
The 1990 and early 2000s cases where the doctrine first
appeared are MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American
Telephone & Telegraph Co.,111 Food & Drug Administration
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.,112 and Utility Air
Regulatory Group v. Environmental Protection Agency.113
Shortly after this line of cases, however, the major questions
doctrine became dormant, causing scholars to question
whether the doctrine was dead.114 But its resurgence in 2014
and 2015—most notably in King v. Burwell115—proved this
was far from the case.
As will be explicated in Part III, the major questions
doctrine cases often illustrate a judicial policy choice to not
defer to agencies. The Court could have let the agency
answer the question, but it believed the issue was of such

110. See id.
111. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co. (MCI), 512 U.S. 218 (1994).
112. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. (Brown & Williamson), 529
U.S. 120 (2000).
113. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA (UARG), 573 U.S. 302 (2014). Whitman
v. American Trucking Association, Inc. is arguably another major questions
doctrine case. 531 U.S. 457 (2001). In Whitman, respondents, private parties and
several states, challenged the Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”)
revised air quality standards under the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) on several grounds.
Id. at 462–63. The Court first held that the CAA’s delegation of authority to the
EPA to set air quality standards at a level “requisite to protect the public health”
was not unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. Id. at 465. But the Court
also held that, contrary to respondents’ argument that the CAA requires the EPA
to consider costs in setting air quality standards, “Congress, we have held, does
not alter the fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or
ancillary provisions—it does not, one might say, hide elephants in mouseholes.”
Id. at 468 (citing to MCI, 512 U.S. at 231; Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159–
60).
114. See, e.g., Abigail R. Moncrieff, Reincarnating the “Major Questions”
Exception to Chevron Deference as a Doctrine of Noninterference (Or Why
Massachusetts v. EPA Got It Wrong), 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 593 (2008). Moncrieff
states that Massachusetts v. EPA signaled the death of the major questions
doctrine. Id. at 594, 598.
115. See Burwell, 135 S. Ct. at 2488–89. The other recent case in which the
major questions doctrine has been invoked is Utility Air Regulatory Group v. EPA
in 2014. 573 U.S. 302 (2014).
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significance that it should be the entity that has the
authority to decide the issue instead. The major questions
doctrine is not only a manifestation of Chevron criticism
generally, but more specifically, it is arguably a
manifestation of the nondelegation argument, because the
Court is concluding that Congress would not have delegated
a question of such “deep economic and political significance”
to the agency. For example, in Burwell, the Court ultimately
reached the same conclusion as the agency in interpreting
the Affordable Care Act, but by taking away agency
deference, it eliminated the opportunity for a future agency
to reverse the decision.
Critics of the major questions doctrine point out that its
invocation seems to be arbitrary or inconsistent,116 not only
in the decision of which cases to invoke the doctrine, 117 but
also in the way it is applied in the cases where that decision
is made. For example, as will be discussed, in both MCI and
Brown & Williamson, the major questions doctrine was
invoked during the Court’s analysis of Chevron Step One.118
In UARG, the major questions doctrine was invoked at
Chevron Step Two. And in Burwell, it was invoked at
Chevron Step Zero. These inconsistencies could signal that
the major questions doctrine is merely a smokescreen for

116. See, e.g., Leske, supra note 5, at 488.
117. Determining which questions are of “deep economic and political
significance” is a vague standard. See, e.g., David Gammage, Foreword—King v.
Burwell Symposium: Comments on the Commentaries (and on Some Elephants in
the Room), 43 PEPP. L. REV. 1, 3, 5 (2015); Kristin E. Hickman, The (Perhaps)
Unintended Consequences of King v. Burwell, 43 PEPP. L. REV. 56, 57 (2015).
118. See, e.g., Leske, supra note 5, at 488 (“In both MCI and Brown &
Williamson, the Court applied the doctrine within Chevron’s Step One
analysis. . . . Thus, in its original form, the major questions doctrine constituted
a narrow expansion of the Chevron framework whereby the Court, in its Chevron
Step One analysis, measured the degree to which the issue at hand was ‘major’
to help determine whether the statutory language was plain and unambiguous.”);
Christopher J. Walker, Toward A Context-Specific Chevron Deference, 81 MO. L.
REV. 1095, 1101 (2016) (“Similarly, Brown & Williamson, on which both UARG
and King relied, applied the major questions doctrine within the two-step
framework at Step One.”).
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policy judgments by the Court, which necessarily results in
an enhancement of the Court’s own interpretive power.
1. MCI Telecommunications
Telephone & Telegraph Co.

Corp.

v.

American

MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. American Telephone
& Telegraph Co. (MCI) was the first case in which the
Supreme Court invoked the major questions doctrine.119 This
case involved the proper interpretation of the term “modify”
under § 203(b) of the Communications Act of 1934. The
Communications Act of 1934 stated that communications
common carriers—such as AT&T—were required to file
tariffs with the Federal Communications Commission
(“FCC”) and then charge customers pursuant to those tariff
rates.120 But the Act also authorized the FCC to “modify” this
requirement “in its discretion and for good cause shown.”121
The FCC argued that because of this discretion to modify, it
could make this requirement voluntary.122 The factual
occurrence that led to the filing of the MCI case was that in
the 1980s, the FCC relieved non-dominant long-distance
carriers from filing tariffs, which left only AT&T subject to
this filing requirement.123
The question before the Court was whether the FCC’s
authority allowed it to interpret the word “modify” to excuse
the other carriers from filing tariffs.124 With Justice Scalia
writing the majority opinion, the Court cited Chevron briefly
in its opinion, but stated that contextual indications were
also important, “which in the present cases . . . contradict

119. MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218 (1994); see also
Leske, supra note 5, at 485; Sunstein, supra note 2, at 236.
120. MCI, 512 U.S. at 220.
121. Id. at 224 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 203(b)(2) (1988 & Supp. IV)).
122. Id. at 225–26.
123. Id. at 221–22.
124. Id. at 220.
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petitioners’ position.”125 The Court noted that “[r]ate filings
are . . . the essential characteristic of a rate-regulated
industry.”126 Because the filing requirement “was Congress’s
chosen means of preventing unreasonableness and
discrimination in charges,”127 the Court rejected the FCC’s
construction, which it deemed a “fundamental revision of the
statute.”128
Characterizing its holding as falling under Chevron Step
One, the Court found “not the slightest doubt” that Congress
had directly spoken on this issue.129 Invoking the major
questions doctrine, the Court concluded: “It is highly unlikely
that Congress would leave the determination of whether an
industry will be entirely, or even substantially, rateregulated to agency discretion—and even more unlikely that
it would achieve that through such a subtle device as
permission to ‘modify’ rate-filing requirements.”130
2. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.
Brown & Williamson was decided six years after MCI.131
The simple issue before the Court was whether the FDA had
the authority to regulate tobacco products.132 The FDA
previously concluded that tobacco came within the scope of
the term “drug” as defined by the FDCA which included
“articles (other than food) intended to affect the structure or
any function of the body.”133 This, in turn, meant that the

125. Id. at 226.
126. Id. at 231.
127. Id. at 230.
128. Id. at 231–32.
129. Id. at 228. The Court does not, however, explicitly cite to Chevron, here.
Nonetheless, whether Congress has spoken on the issue in question is a Step One
inquiry.
130. Id. at 231.
131. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000).
132. Id. at 125.
133. Id. at 126 (quoting 21 U.S.C § 321(g)(1)(C) (1994 & Supp. III)).

2019]

DISPLACING INTERPRETIVE POWER

1107

FDA could regulate tobacco products’ promotion, labeling,
and accessibility to children and adolescents.134 Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corporation filed suit challenging the
FDA’s regulations.
In holding that Congress had not given the FDA the
authority to regulate tobacco products, the Supreme Court
turned to a Chevron analysis: “A threshold issue is the
appropriate framework for analyzing the FDA’s assertion of
authority to regulate tobacco products.”135 “Because this case
involves an administrative agency’s construction of a statute
that it administers, our analysis is governed by
Chevron . . . .”136
Notably, however, that was not the end of the Court’s
analysis. The Court also stated other principles that were
pertinent to the case before it. Towards the end of the
opinion, the Court wrote that its Step One analysis—“our
inquiry into whether Congress has directly spoken to the
precise question at issue”—was “shaped . . . by the nature of
the question presented.”137 Referencing and then narrowing
Chevron’s implied delegation rationale, the Court stated:
“Deference under Chevron to an agency’s construction of a
statute that it administers is premised on the theory that a
statute’s ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation from
Congress to the agency to fill in the statutory gaps.”138 “In
extraordinary cases, however, there may be reason to
hesitate before concluding that Congress has intended such

134. Id. at 125.
135. Id. at 132.
136. Id. “Under Chevron, a reviewing court must first ask ‘whether Congress
has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.’ If Congress has done so, the
inquiry is at an end; the court ‘must give effect to the unambiguously expressed
intent of Congress.’ But if Congress has not specifically addressed the question,
a reviewing court must respect the agency’s construction of the statute so long as
it is permissible.” Id. (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc.,
467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984)) (internal citations omitted).
137. Id. at 159.
138. Id. (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844).
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an implicit delegation.”139
In the Court’s view, Brown & Williamson was an
extraordinary case.140 Tobacco had a “unique place in
American history and society,” which led “Congress, for
better or for worse . . . to preclude any agency from
exercising significant policymaking authority in the area.”141
In its reasoning, the Court found MCI to be instructive: “As
in MCI, we are confident that Congress could not have
intended to delegate a decision of such economic and political
significance to an agency in so cryptic a fashion.”142 The
Court thus concluded that Congress had directly spoken to
the issue and precluded the FDA from regulating tobacco
products.143
3. Utility Air Regulatory Group v. Environmental
Protection Agency
Utility Air Regulatory Group v. Environmental
Protection (UARG) was decided in 2014 and marked the first
time the Court applied the major questions doctrine since
2001.144 This was also the first time the Court applied the
doctrine outside of its Chevron Step One analysis. The
invocation of the major questions doctrine came in the
Court’s Chevron Step Two analysis in UARG.145

139. Id. (citing Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and
Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 363, 370 (1986) (“A court may also ask whether the legal
question is an important one. Congress is more likely to have focused upon, and
answered, major questions, while leaving interstitial matters to answer
themselves in the course of the statute’s daily administration”)).
140. Id. (“This is hardly an ordinary case.”).
141. Id. at 159–60.
142. Id. at 160. The Court stressed, no matter how serious the issue, “an
administrative agency’s power to regulate in the public interest must always be
grounded in a valid grant of authority from Congress.” Id. at 123.
143. Id. at 160–61.
144. Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302 (2014) (UARG).
145. See, e.g., Leske, supra note 5, at 494 (“Thus, the Court twice addressed
the major questions doctrine in its Chevron Step Two analysis, but with different
results.”); Walker, supra note 118, at 1101 (“Justice Scalia’s invocation of the
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After the Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v.
EPA,146 which held that air pollution was subject to
Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) regulation under
the Clean Air Act (“CAA”), the Court granted certiorari to
hear challenges to these regulations. The specific question in
UARG was whether the EPA’s promulgation of greenhouse
gas (“GHG”) emission standards for new motor vehicles
compelled the agency to regulate certain “stationary sources”
of GHG emissions, such as power plants or industrial
facilities.147 Alternatively, even if the EPA was not compelled
to regulate these stationary sources, the Court also
considered whether the EPA was permitted to do so under
the CAA.148
The Court broke down its analysis even further,
resulting in a fairly complex decision,149 but, for the purposes
of this Article, what is significant is that the majority opinion
stated that its review of the EPA’s interpretations of the CAA
was governed by Chevron150 and that the major questions
doctrine was invoked not during the Court’s Step One
analysis, but under Step Two.
Under Chevron Step One, the Court concluded that the
major questions doctrine took place . . . as part of the Step Two inquiry in
UARG.”).
146. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). Many scholars note that the
Court had the chance to invoke the major questions doctrine in this case but chose
not to, which led some to believe the doctrine was dead or dormant. See, e.g.,
Moncrieff, supra note 114, at 607.
147. UARG, 573 U.S. at 314.
148. Id. at 321.
149. See id. at 314–15 (“This litigation presents two distinct challenges to
EPA’s stance on greenhouse-gas permitting for stationary sources. First, we must
decide whether EPA permissibly determined that a source may be subject to the
PSD and Title V permitting requirements on the sole basis of the source’s
potential to emit greenhouse gases. Second, we must decide whether EPA
permissibly determined that a source already subject to the PSD program
because of its emission of conventional pollutants (an ‘anyway’ source) may be
required to limit its greenhouse-gas emissions by employing the ‘best available
control technology’ for greenhouse gases.”).
150. Id. at 315.

1110

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

CAA was ambiguous, thus rejecting the EPA’s argument that
under the plain language of the CAA, a source not otherwise
regulated because of its emissions of conventional pollutants
must be subject to applicable permitting requirements based
solely on its potential to emit greenhouse gases.151
Disagreeing, the Court found that there was “no insuperable
textual barrier to EPA’s interpreting ‘any air pollutant’ in
the permitting triggers [of the CAA] to encompass only
pollutants emitted in quantities that enable them to be
sensibly regulated at the statutory thresholds, and to
exclude [GHGs] that are emitted in such vast quantities that
their inclusion would radically transform those programs
and render them unworkable as written.”152
Then, after rejecting the EPA’s plain language
argument, the Court turned to Chevron Step Two to
determine whether the EPA’s interpretation was
reasonable.153 The Court noted that “reasonable statutory
interpretation” must consider both “the specific context in
which . . . language is used” and “the broader context of the
statute as a whole.”154 Clarifying further, “a statutory
‘provision that may seem ambiguous in isolation is often
clarified
by
the
remainder
of
the
statutory
scheme . . . because only one of the permissible meanings
produces a substantive effect that is compatible with the rest
of the law.’”155 And “an agency interpretation that is
‘inconsisten[t] with the design and structure of the statute as
a whole’ does not merit deference.”156
Applying these principles, the Court found that the

151. Id. at 313–16.
152. Id. at 320.
153. Id. at 321 (“[W]e next consider the [EPA’s] alternative position that its
interpretation was justified as an exercise of its ‘discretion’ to adopt ‘a reasonable
construction of the statute.’”).
154. Id. (internal citations omitted).
155. Id. (internal citations omitted).
156. Id. (internal citations omitted).
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EPA’s interpretation was incompatible with the regulatory
scheme as this would “overthrow” the Act’s “structure and
design.”157 Additionally, this interpretation was contrary to
Congress’s intent as applied to smaller stationary sources.158
It was at this point in the Court’s opinion that the Court
applied the major questions doctrine. Rather than stop at
Step Two, the Court went on to say that the conclusion that
the EPA’s interpretation was unreasonable was also
compelled by the major questions doctrine.159
“EPA’s interpretation is also unreasonable because it
would bring about an enormous and transformative
expansion in EPA’s regulatory authority without clear
congressional authorization.”160 The Court cited both MCI
and Brown & Williamson for the premise that in
circumstances where an agency’s interpretation impacts “a
significant portion of the American economy,” courts ought
to be hesitant in adopting such an interpretation without
clear direction by Congress.161 The Court was uncomfortable

157. Id. The Court first pointed to practical reasons: The EPA’s interpretation
would cause an extreme rise in permit applications, cause administrative costs
to swell, and decade-long delays that would cause construction projects to grind
to a halt nationwide.
158. Id. at 322–23. According to the Court’s reading of Congress’s intention in
designing the permitting programs, both the PSD program and Title V of the CAA
were not meant to apply to smaller stationary sources. Id. at 323 (“Not
surprisingly, EPA acknowledges that PSD review is a ‘complicated, resourceintensive, time-consuming, and sometimes contentious process’ suitable for
‘hundreds of larger sources,’ not ‘tens of thousands of smaller sources.’”) (“As EPA
wrote, Title V is ‘finely crafted for thousands,’ not millions, of sources.”).
159. Id. at 323–24 (“The fact that EPA’s greenhouse-gas-inclusive
interpretation of the PSD and Title V triggers would place plainly excessive
demands on limited governmental resources is alone a good reason for rejecting
it; but that is not the only reason.”).
160. Id. at 324.
161. Id. (“When an agency claims to discover in a long-extant statute an
unheralded power to regulate ‘a significant portion of the American
economy’ . . . we typically greet its announcement with a measure of
skepticism. We expect Congress to speak clearly if it wishes to assign to an
agency decisions of vast ‘economic and political significance.’” (citing Brown &
Williamson, 529 U.S. at 159–60; MCI, 512 U.S. at 231)).
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with “an agency laying claim to extravagant statutory power
over the national economy while at the same time
strenuously asserting that the authority claimed would
render the statute ‘unrecognizable to the Congress that
designed’ it.”162 Thus, the Court concluded, as part of a major
questions doctrine analysis, that the EPA’s interpretation
was unreasonable.163
The next question before the Court in UARG provides an
example of the Court applying the major questions doctrine,
but still allowing the agency’s regulation to stand. At this
point in the case, the Court still had to determine whether
the EPA permissibly determined that an “anyway source” (a
source already subject to the CAA permitting program
because of its emission of conventional pollutants) “may be
required to limit its [GHG] emissions” by having to install
best available control technology (“BACT”).164 Similar to the
previous analysis, the Court found that under Step One of
Chevron, the BACT provision was unambiguous and did
indeed apply to GHG emissions from “anyway sources.”165
Again, the Court’s analysis could have ended there, this
time at Step One. But instead, the Court went on to say that
even if the plain text of the BACT provision “were not clear,”
the EPA’s interpretation was not unreasonable under
Chevron Step Two.166 This was not a “major question”
because “applying BACT to greenhouse gases is not so
disastrously unworkable, and need not result in such a
dramatic expansion of agency authority.”167

162. Id.
163. Id. (“Since, as we hold above, the statute does not compel EPA’s
interpretation, it would be patently unreasonable—not to say outrageous—for
EPA to insist on seizing expansive power that it admits the statute is not
designed to grant.”).
164. Id. at 315–16.
165. Id. at 330–32.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 332.

2019]

DISPLACING INTERPRETIVE POWER

1113

In sum, the Court struck down an EPA interpretation of
the CAA because the issue was one of “vast ‘economic and
political significance’” and the EPA’s interpretation “would
bring about an enormous and transformative expansion in
EPA’s regulatory authority without clear congressional
authorization.”168
4. King v. Burwell
The most recent case to invoke the major questions
doctrine was King v. Burwell in 2015.169 Burwell upheld a
regulation promulgated by the Internal Revenue Service
(“IRS”) that interpreted a key provision of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”).170 Before
reviewing the Court’s analysis, some background is
necessary to understand the contours of the case and to
suggest why the Court believed the major questions doctrine
was relevant.
The ACA was enacted to increase the number of
Americans covered by health insurance and to decrease the
cost of health care. In order to accomplish these goals, the
ACA adopted three “interlocking” reforms that applied to all
states: (1) insurance market regulations; (2) a coverage
mandate; and (3) tax credits.171
The first reform, the insurance market regulations, “bars
insurers from denying coverage to any person because of his
health”172 and “bars insurers from charging a person higher
premiums for the same reason.”173 The second reform, the
coverage mandate, requires that individuals maintain health

168. Id. at 324 (quoting Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 160).
169. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480 (2015).
170. Id.
171. Id. at 2482.
172. Id. This is known as the “guaranteed issue” requirement. 42 U.S.C.
§ 300gg–1(a).
173. Id. This is known as the “community rating” requirement. 42 U.S.C.
§ 300gg.
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insurance coverage or pay a penalty to the IRS.174 The second
reform was enacted as an incentive to avoid the problem of
individuals waiting to purchase health insurance until they
were sick.175 This coverage mandate “minimize[d] this
adverse selection and broaden[ed] the health insurance risk
pool to include healthy individuals, which [would] lower
health insurance premiums.”176 Congress also provided an
exemption from the coverage requirement for anyone who
has to spend more than eight percent of his or her income on
health insurance.177
The third reform, the tax credits, sought to make
insurance more affordable to low income individuals.
Individuals with household incomes between 100 and 400
percent of the federal poverty line were able to purchase
insurance with tax credits, which were provided directly to
the insurer.178 The Court noted the importance of how closely
intertwined these three reforms were: “Congress found that
the guaranteed issue and community rating requirements
would not work without the coverage requirement. And the
coverage requirement would not work without the tax
credits.”179
Lastly, in addition to the three reforms, the ACA
required the creation of an “Exchange” in each state. An
Exchange acted as a marketplace where people could
compare and purchase insurance plans.180 “The Act gives
each State the opportunity to establish its own Exchange,

174. Id. at 2486 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 5000A).
175. Id.
176. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(I)).
177. Id. at 2486–87 (citing 26 U.S.C. §§ 5000A(e)(1)(A), (e)(1)(B)(ii)).
178. Id. at 2487 (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 18081, 18082).
179. Id. (internal citation omitted). The reason all three reforms had to be in
place to work was because “without the tax credits, the cost of buying insurance
would exceed eight percent of income for a large number of individuals, which
would exempt them from the coverage requirement.” Id.
180. Id.
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but provides that the Federal Government will establish the
Exchange if the State does not.”181
The issue before the Court in Burwell was “whether the
Act’s tax credits are available in States that have a Federal
Exchange,” so that “the Act’s interlocking reforms apply
equally in each State no matter who establishes the State’s
Exchange.”182
The ACA initially states that tax credits “shall be
allowed” for any “applicable taxpayer.”183 Subsequently, in
what seems like a contradiction, the ACA provides that the
“amount of the tax credit depends in part on whether the
taxpayer has enrolled in an insurance plan through ‘an
Exchange established by the State under section 1311 of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.’”184
The IRS issued a regulation that made tax credits
available on both State and Federal Exchanges.185
Specifically, the IRS interpreted the provision to determine
tax credit eligibility based on enrollment in an insurance
plan through “an Exchange,” which it defined as “an
Exchange serving the individual market . . . regardless of
whether the Exchange is established and operated by a
State . . . or by HHS.”186
Petitioners challenging the IRS interpretation were
individuals living in a state that had a Federal Exchange
who did not wish to purchase health insurance.187 Their

181. Id. at 2485.
182. Id.
183. Id. at 2487 (citing 26 U.S.C. § 36B(a)).
184. Id. (citing 26 U.S.C. §§ 36B(b)–(c)) (emphasis in original).
185. Id. (citing 77 Fed. Reg. 30378 (2012)).
186. Id. (quoting 26 CFR § 1.36B-2 (2013) and 45 CFR § 155.20 (2014)).
187. Id. If Virginia’s Exchange did not qualify as “an Exchange established by
the State under [42 U.S.C. § 18031],” Petitioners would not receive any tax
credits. If they did not receive the tax credits, the cost of buying insurance would
be “more than eight percent of their income, which would exempt them from the
Act’s coverage requirement.” Id. (citing 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(e)(1)).
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argument was that the tax credits were not available for
individuals who enrolled in insurance plans through a
Federal Exchange because, based on the ACA, a Federal
Exchange is not “an Exchange established by the State under
[42 U.S.C. § 18031].”188
The Supreme Court noted a circuit split that resulted in
differing applicability of the tax credits. In this case, the
Fourth Circuit viewed the Act as “ambiguous and subject to
at least two different interpretations,” ultimately deferring
to the IRS’s interpretation under Chevron.189 On the same
day that the Fourth Circuit issued its decision, the D.C.
Circuit struck down the IRS Rule, holding under Chevron
Step One that the ACA “unambiguously restricts” the tax
credits to state Exchanges.190
Rather than side with one of the two circuits and conduct
its analysis under Chevron, though, the Supreme Court
found for the first time that the application of the major
questions doctrine rendered Chevron wholly inapplicable.191
Quoting Brown & Williamson, the Court wrote that
applicability of Chevron is “premised on the theory that the
statute’s ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation from
Congress to the agency to fill in the statutory gaps,” and “[i]n
extraordinary cases . . . there may be reason to hesitate
before concluding that Congress has intended such an
implicit delegation.”192
According to the Court, this was such a case.193 The
Court stated that the tax credits were among the ACA’s “key
reforms,” which involved “billions of dollars in spending each
year and affecting the price of health insurance for millions

188. Id.
189. Id. at 2488.
190. Id. (citing Halbig v. Burwell, 758 F.3d 390, 394 (2014)).
191. Id. at 2488–89.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 2489.
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of people.”194 Quoting UARG, the question of whether the tax
credits were available on Federal Exchanges was thus “a
question of deep ‘economic and political significance’ that is
central to this statutory scheme.”195 “[H]ad Congress wished
to assign that question to an agency, it surely would have
done so expressly.”196 The Court considered it even more
unlikely that Congress would have delegated this decision to
the IRS, “which has no expertise in crafting health insurance
policy of this sort.”197 The Court concluded: “This is not a case
for the IRS.”198
In concluding, the Court necessarily gave the power to
interpret the ACA to the Court itself.199 Reverting to
traditional principles of statutory interpretation such as
enforcing the plain language of the statute and reading the
words in context “with a view to their place in the overall
statutory scheme,”200 the Court ultimately concluded that
the ACA “allows tax credits for insurance purchased on any
Exchange created under the Act.”201
Burwell is different from the previous cases that invoked
the major questions doctrine because of both how and when
the doctrine was invoked. MCI and Brown & Williamson
invoked the major questions doctrine as part of the Step One
inquiry.202 UARG invoked the major questions doctrine as
194. Id.
195. Id. (quoting Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA (UARG), 573 U.S. 302, 324
(2014)).
196. Id. (citing UARG, 573 U.S. at 324).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. (“It is instead our task to determine the correct reading of Section
36B.”) (emphasis added).
200. Id. (“Our duty, after all, is ‘to construe statutes, not isolated provisions.’”).
201. Id. at 2496.
202. In Brown & Williamson, the Court went back and characterized its
holding in MCI as falling within the Step One inquiry: “We rejected the FCC’s
construction, finding ‘not the slightest doubt’ that Congress had directly spoken
to the question.” FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160
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part of the Step Two inquiry.203 However, despite being
invoked at different steps within the Chevron analysis, the
major questions doctrine was still invoked as a step within
the Chevron analysis in those cases. In other words, the
Court still defaulted to Chevron and held that Chevron
applied. Burwell, however, invoked the major questions
doctrine as a threshold, Step Zero inquiry,204 finding instead
that Chevron does not apply.
In Burwell, the Court concluded that the statute was
ambiguous and that the agency’s interpretation was
reasonable. That could have been done through a standard
Chevron Step One and Step Two analysis. Or, the Court
could have engaged in a Chevron Step Zero analysis.205 But
that is not what the Court chose to do. The Court arrived at
its conclusion by deciding that it—the Court, rather than the
agency—was the entity with the power to interpret the
statutory ambiguity.206 And it did so by invoking the major
questions doctrine. It is of some significance that the Court
(2000) (quoting MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 512 U.S. 218, 228
(1994)). Then, the Court concluded the same for the case before it as well, holding
that “Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.” Id. at 159.
Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’n also invoked the major questions doctrine
as part of the Step One inquiry. 531 U.S. 457, 471 (2001) (“The text of § 109(b),
interpreted in its statutory and historical context and with appreciation for its
importance to the [Clean Air Act] as a whole, unambiguously bars cost
considerations from the NAAQS-setting process, and thus ends the matter for us
as well as the EPA.”).
203. UARG, 573 U.S. at 324 (“EPA’s interpretation is also unreasonable
because it would bring about an enormous and transformative expansion in
EPA’s regulatory authority without clear congressional authorization.”).
204. Without attempting to explain why the Court applies the major questions
doctrine at different points of its Chevron analysis, as that is beyond the scope of
this Article, two scholars interestingly observed the impact this decision could
make. See Stephanie Hoffer & Christopher J. Walker, Is the Chief Justice a Tax
Lawyer?, 2015 PEPP. L. REV. 33, 40 (noting that the application of the major
questions doctrine at Step Zero or Step One—as opposed to Step Two—has the
additional benefit of “foreclos[ing] a subsequent presidential administration from
reinterpreting the statute via regulation to prohibit tax subsidies in exchanges
established by the Federal Government”).
205. See Part III.B.2.
206. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. at 2489.
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invoked the major questions doctrine to take away agency
deference only to come to the same conclusion as the agency.
One possible reason for this move in Burwell is that by taking
away agency discretion, the Court eliminated the possibility
of agency reversal in interpretation of the Affordable Care
Act in a new presidential administration.
III. POLICY JUDGMENTS THAT SERVE TO ENHANCE THE
COURT’S POWER
Justice Gorsuch’s remedy for unconstitutional
delegations under Chevron207 is essentially the same remedy
that the major questions doctrine has been effectuating in
the Court: have the Court be the entity that answers the
question at hand, rather than the agency. However, this does
not solve the problem of unconstitutional delegations.
According to Justice Gorsuch, Chevron violates the
separation of powers because it allows Congress to
unconstitutionally delegate too much of its power to
executive agencies. However, if the remedy is not a judicial
invalidation of the delegation on constitutional grounds—
which, it is not under both Justice Gorsuch’s view and the
major questions doctrine—then this Article argues that what
really underlies the arguments over Chevron’s existence are
policy disagreements over the proper role of the current
administrative state.
A. “Re-Routing Delegation to the Courts,” Not Congress
Justice Gorsuch’s second argument against Chevron
from his Gutierrez-Brizuela concurrence was that the
amount of interpretive authority Chevron vests in agencies
violates the nondelegation doctrine.208 This Article claims
that Justice Gorsuch’s argument fails because, assuming
there was an unconstitutional delegation by Congress to
207. See Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1149 (10th Cir. 2016)
(Gorsuch, J., concurring).
208. See id.
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begin with,209 re-routing the authority to answer the
question from the executive agency to the Court does not
make the delegation constitutional.
Asher Steinberg also acknowledges that, in responding
to Chevron’s premise (that statutory ambiguities delegate
interstitial lawmaking authority to the executive), Justice
Gorsuch “suggests the delegations Chevron presupposes are
unconstitutional under even the current instantiation of the
nondelegation doctrine, to which no statute has fallen victim
in eighty years.”210 Again, assuming for the sake of argument
that Justice Gorsuch is correct about the unconstitutionality
of the delegations that Congress gives to agencies, Justice
Gorsuch’s remedy is misguided. The proper remedy would be
to send the question back to Congress, but Justice Gorsuch
is clear that he believes the Court should be the one to
answer it. As Steinberg surmises:
The remedy for an unconstitutional delegation is to invalidate the
delegation and suggest that Congress write a clearer law. Judge
Gorsuch seems to think an equally good remedy is to pretend the
delegation isn’t there. Holding that courts get to decide the meaning
of an indeterminate term like “stationary source” or “sexual abuse
of a minor” wouldn’t make the delegations embedded in those
indeterminacies go away; it would just re-route the delegations to
courts, a result that (besides not being what Congress wanted or
making any practical sense) isn’t any more constitutional than
letting agencies keep them. Courts, to be sure, would claim they
were finding what “sexual abuse of a minor” and the like “really”
meant, but who besides Judge Gorsuch would believe them?211

Steinberg borrows a quote from Justice Gorsuch’s
predecessor to further demonstrate his point. In Industrial
Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute (the
209. The intelligible principle argument would conclude otherwise in most
cases.
210. Asher Steinberg, Judge Gorsuch and Chevron Doctrine Part III: The
Gutierrez-Brizuela Concurring Opinion, NOTICE & COMMENT (Mar. 29, 2017),
http://yalejreg.com/ nc/judge-gorsuch-and-chevron-doctrine-part-ii-the-gutierrezbrizuela-concurring-opinion-by-asher-steinberg/. See id. for a response to all
“three” arguments in Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence.
211. Id.
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Benzene Case), the Supreme Court avoided a nondelegation
problem by giving content to a vague statute. Justice Scalia
later commented on the decision, stating that the Court
should have struck the statute down or let the agency’s
interpretation stand.212 Justice Scalia wrote: “In giving
content to a law which in fact says no more than that OSHA
should ensure ‘safe places of employment’ (whatever that
means) and should maximize protection against toxic
materials ‘to the extent feasible’ (whatever that means), it
was the plurality of the Court, rather than OSHA, that ended
up doing legislator’s work.”213 Justice Scalia understood that
“absent the enforcement of a nondelegation doctrine that he
came to recognize was unenforceable, denying deference to
agencies would result in courts doing legislator’s work.”214
The Benzene Case was not the only time Justice Scalia
defended Chevron against the nondelegation doctrine.
Justice Scalia authored the majority opinion in Whitman v.
American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc.,215 a case that many hoped
would reestablish the nondelegation doctrine. In Whitman,
the Court upheld the EPA’s revision of air quality standards
against a nondelegation challenge.216 The Court held that
the CAA’s delegation of authority to the EPA to set the air
quality standards at a level “requisite . . . to protect the
public health” was not an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power.217 The scope of discretion allowed by the
relevant section of the CAA was held to be “well within the
outer limits of [our] nondelegation precedents.”218 The Court

212. Id. (quoting Antonin Scalia, A note on the Benzene case, AEI J. ON GOV’T
& SOC’Y (Aug. 6, 1980, 7:36 p.m.)).
213. Id. (quoting Antonin Scalia, A note on the Benzene case, AEI J. ON GOV’T
& SOC’Y (Aug. 6, 1980, 7:36 p.m.)).
214. Id.
215. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
216. See id.
217. Id. at 475–76.
218. Id. at 474.
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also noted that it has only ever found an “intelligible
principle” lacking and therefore was required to strike down
the corresponding statute on nondelegation doctrine grounds
twice in its history.219
Justice Scalia defended Chevron against its detractors
both left and right, seeing it as a useful constraint on activist
courts. Justice Scalia was opposed to having the Court do the
legislature’s work. In a 1989 article, Justice Scalia defended
Chevron by writing that “[b]road delegation to the Executive
is the hallmark of the modern administrative state,” and
Chevron provides a “background rule of law against which
Congress can legislate.”220 Justice Scalia assumed the legal
fiction of implied delegation—that Congress intends for
agencies to exercise their discretion:
Congress now knows that the ambiguities it creates, whether
intentionally or unintentionally, will be resolved, within the bounds
of permissible interpretation, not by the courts but by a particular
agency, whose policy biases will ordinarily be known. The
legislative process becomes less of a sporting event when those
supporting and opposing a particular disposition do not have to
gamble upon whether, if they say nothing about it in the statute,
the ultimate answer will be provided by the courts or rather by the
Department of Labor.221

Justice Scalia also considered the fact that agencies can
change the resolution of these statutory ambiguities as their
knowledge and the political desires of their constituents
changes to be a good thing, permitting the “needed
flexibility” and “appropriate political participation” in the
administrative process.222
219. Id.
220. Scalia, supra note 22, at 516–17.
221. Id. at 517.
222. Id.
One of the major disadvantages of having the courts resolve ambiguities
is that they resolve them for ever and ever; only statutory amendment
can produce a change. If the word “stationary source” in the Clean Air
Act did not permit the “bubble concept” today, it would not permit the
“bubble concept” four years from now either, no matter how much the
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Justice Gorsuch, on the other hand, advocates for the
overturn of Chevron, arguing that it is better for the Court to
do the legislator’s work than the agencies. Justice Gorsuch
views Chevron as a potential threat to the fundamental
obligation of the judiciary to interpret statutes and “say what
the law is.”223
Justice Gorsuch and others critique Chevron, and many
use the major questions doctrine to do so, claiming as a
matter of separation of powers to be returning power to
Congress when, in reality, they are giving power to the
courts. However, there is a valid argument that courts
should not make policy choices. The judiciary is an unelected
branch, while agencies have political accountability under
the President. “[W]hen congressional instructions are either
vague or absent, judges should assume that Congress
delegated resolution of those statutory ambiguities to the
Executive. In most such cases, of course, Congress did not
speak to the question of interpretive authority, either
explicitly or implicitly, so the delegation is purely fictional—
a judicial presumption.”224 But this “fiction” that Chevron
deference rests on Congress’s choice to delegate lawinterpreting power to administrative agencies is justified by
the argument that “a reasonable legislator in the modern
administrative state would rather give law-interpreting
perception of whether that concept impairs or furthers the objectives of
the Act may change. Under Chevron, however, “stationary source” can
mean a range of things, and it is up to the agency, in light of its
advancing knowledge (and also, to be realistic about it, in light of the
changing political pressures that it feels from Congress and from its
various constituencies) to specify the correct meaning. If Congress is to
delegate broadly, as modern times are thought to demand, it seems to
me desirable that the delegee be able to suit its actions to the times, and
that continuing political accountability be assured, through direct
political pressures upon the Executive and through the indirect political
pressure of congressional oversight.
Id. at 517-18.
223. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the
province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”).
224. Moncrieff, supra note 114, at 608.
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power to agencies than to courts.”225 The Chevron opinion
itself included the greater political accountability of agencies
and the executive branch as a specific policy reason for the
courts to defer to agencies.226
Whether the critique of Chevron is through the
nondelegation argument that Justice Gorsuch makes in his
Tenth Circuit Gutierrez-Brizuela concurrence, or whether it
is through the increasingly common invocation of the major
questions doctrine in Supreme Court jurisprudence,227
denying deference to agencies is resulting in courts doing the
legislator’s work—and often under the guise of preventing
unconstitutional delegations and restoring the proper
separation of powers.
B. How the Court Would Resolve the Issue Absent Invocation
of the MQD
As is clear from MCI, Brown & Williamson, UARG, and
Burwell, one of the larger ramifications of the major
questions doctrine is the diminution of agency deference and
the enhancement of the courts’ interpretive role.228 The
225. Id.
226. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865
(1984) (“While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief
Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the
Government to make such policy choices . . . .”).
227. The major questions doctrine is also sometimes rationalized by the
nondelegation argument. See infra note 6; see also infra note 104 and
accompanying text.
228. With the recent appointments of both Justice Gorsuch and Justice
Kavanaugh to the bench, both of whom have criticized Chevron deference, see
Gutierrez-Brizuela, 834 F.3d at 1149–58 (Gorsuch, J., concurring) and Brett M.
Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2150–54
(2016) (raising concerns about Chevron and suggesting limitations to the
doctrine) (reviewing Robert A. Katzmann, Judging Statutes (2014)), there is a
legitimate threat that the major questions doctrine will be used to further scale
back Chevron’s domain. See also Justice Gorsuch’s dissent in Gundy v. United
States, 588 U.S. ___ (2019) (holding that 34 U.S.C. § 20913(d), part of the Sex
Offender Registration and Notification Act, does not violate the nondelegation
doctrine) and his concurrence in Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U.S. ___ (2019) (upholding
Auer deference) (where he was joined by Justice Kavanaugh) for recent examples
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Court has never provided an explanation for why it invokes
the doctrine at different points in its Chevron analysis.229
Nor has the Court explained when it will consider a case to
be of deep economic and political significance. MCI, Brown &
Williamson, UARG, and Burwell all demonstrate this.
Rather, the invocation of the doctrine seems only to be
comprised of “episodes of vaguely equitable intervention,
where the Court’s ‘olfactory sense detects the odor of
administrative waywardness.’”230 The major question
doctrine’s arbitrary and inconsistent application may
suggest certain implications behind its invocation.
Taking a closer analysis of Brown & Williamson and
Burwell, this Section will argue that these cases could have
been resolved within the Chevron framework and without
invocation of the major questions doctrine. By reevaluating
the cases to determine how the Court would resolve the issue
absent invocation of the major questions doctrine, this
Section will demonstrate that a possible reason for the
arbitrariness is because the major questions doctrine is
acting as a super-strong clear statement rule231 that permits

of arguments in favor of greater judicial control over the administrative state.
229. See, e.g., Leske, supra note 5, at 488–89 (“[I]n key cases such as MCI and
Brown & Williamson . . . the Court did not engage in a discussion or elaboration
of [the major question doctrine’s] contours. Nor was there any mention of how the
major questions doctrine fit within the Chevron analysis or whether it should be
applied exclusively at Chevron Step One.”); Major Question Objections, supra
note 5, at 2197 (“[T]he [major questions] exception has never been justified by
any coherent rationale.”).
230. Major Question Objections, supra note 5, at 2192 (quoting Colin S. Diver,
Statutory Interpretation in the Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 598
(1985)).
231. As termed by William Eskridge, a “super-strong clear statement rule”
requires “very specifically targeted ‘clear statements’ on the face of the statute to
rebut a policy presumption the Court has created.” Eskridge and Frickey, supra
note 104, at 595 n.4. Contrast this with regular “clear statement rules,” which
“require a ‘clear statement’ on the face of the statute to rebut a policy
presumption the Court has created” and “presumptions,” which “are general
policies the Court will ‘presume’ Congress intends to incorporate into
statutes . . . [and] can be rebutted by persuasive arguments that the statutory
text, legislative history, or purpose is inconsistent with the presumptions.” Id.
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an escape from conclusions that could otherwise be drawn
using agency power. The clear statement rule is a guideline
for statutory construction that instructs courts not to
interpret a statute in a way that will bring about a particular
result unless the statute makes unmistakably clear its intent
to achieve that result. Applied in this context, it would be
read to say that deference will not be given to agencies absent
unmistakably clear statutory language. Under this
argument, then, the major questions doctrine acts more as a
facade for the Court’s separation of power effort to diminish
administrative power.232
1. Brown & Williamson Revisited
In Brown & Williamson, the issue again was whether the
FDA had the authority to regulate tobacco products. The
FDA’s position was that it had such authority because the
FDCA defined drug as including “articles (other than food)
intended to affect the structure or any function of the
body.”233 The Court concluded otherwise, though, by
invoking the major questions doctrine during its application
of Chevron Step One.234 Because of tobacco’s “unique place in
232. Justice Gorsuch is not the first person on the bench to question the growth
of executive agencies’ power. Chief Justice Roberts’ dissent in City of Arlington v.
FCC is well-known for his critique of the administrative state. 569 U.S. 290, 313
(2013) (Roberts, J., dissenting). As surmised by Chief Justice Roberts, agencies
today “exercise legislative power, by promulgating regulations with the force of
law; executive power, by policing compliance with those regulations; and judicial
power, by adjudicating enforcement actions and imposing sanctions on those
found to have violated their rules.” Id. at 312–13 (Roberts, J., dissenting). Add
that with the improbability that a President has the time or the desire to
“supervise so broad a swath of regulatory activity,” then “the danger posed by the
growing power of the administrative state cannot be dismissed.” Id. at 313, 315
(Roberts, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). Justice Thomas also
questioned the Chevron doctrine in his Michigan v. EPA concurrence: “These
cases bring into bold relief the scope of the potentially unconstitutional
delegations we have come to countenance in the name of Chevron deference.” 135
S. Ct. 2699, 2713 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring).
233. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 126 (2000)
(quoting 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(C) (1994 & Supp. III)).
234. Chevron Step One seeks to ascertain whether the meaning from the
statute is clear, and if so, then that meaning controls. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat.
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American history and society,” and the lack of an explicit
delegation from Congress combined with several pieces of
legislation on tobacco that suggested a congressional intent
to retain jurisdiction, the Court held that Congress had
directly spoken to the issue.235 Brown & Williamson was a
clear statement case because the major questions doctrine
gave the Court an escape from the conclusion that would
otherwise be drawn using agency power. The Court stated
that it could not interpret the FDCA in a way that would
bring about a result it believed was not intended by
Congress, especially when that particular result was not
unmistakably clear from the text of the statute itself.
Arguably, though, the Court could have decided the issue
without invoking the major questions doctrine, and instead
could have relied solely on contextual evidence to inform the
meaning of the statute under Chevron Step One. In Brown &
Williamson, there was considerable contextual evidence the
majority could draw upon of separate statutory
pronouncements on tobacco regulation that might lead the
Court to judge that the language in the FDCA permitting the
FDA to regulate drugs did not include tobacco. This
contextual evidence included the fact that the FDA
consistently stated before 1995 that it lacked jurisdiction
over tobacco,236 that Congress had enacted several tobaccospecific statutes fully cognizant of the FDA’s position,237 and
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).
235. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 160–61.
236. Id. at 144 (pointing to the “FDA’s consistent and repeated statements that
it lacked authority under the FDCA to regulate tobacco absent claims of
therapeutic benefit by the manufacturer”).
237. Id. at 143–44.
Congress has enacted six separate pieces of legislation since 1965
addressing the problem of tobacco use and human health. . . . Those
statutes, among other things, require that health warnings appear on
all packaging and in all print and outdoor advertisements, see 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1331, 1333, 4402; prohibit the advertisement of tobacco products
through “any medium of electronic communication” subject to regulation
by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), see §§ 1335, 4402(f);
require the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to report
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that Congress had considered and rejected many bills that
would have given the agency such authority.238 Thus, the
Court wrote, “[u]nder these circumstances, it is evident that
Congress’ tobacco-specific statutes have effectively ratified
the FDA’s long-held position that it lacks jurisdiction under
the FDCA to regulate tobacco products. Congress has created
a distinct regulatory scheme to address the problem of
tobacco and health, and that scheme, as presently
constructed, precludes any role for the FDA.”239
The above could have been enough to find that the
seemingly clear language in the FDCA permitting the FDA
to regulate drugs did not include tobacco, ending its inquiry
at Chevron Step One. Nevertheless, rather than cabining its
discussion to the plain meaning of the statute—informed by
these separate statutory pronouncements—the Court went
beyond Chevron Step One to include a consideration of how
likely it was that Congress delegated “a policy decision of
such economic and political magnitude to an administrative
agency.”240 By invoking the major questions doctrine here,
the Court limited the role of Chevron and of agency
determinations more generally.
2. Burwell Revisited
Similarly, in King v. Burwell, the Court could have
reached its conclusion without invocation of the major
every three years to Congress on research findings concerning “the
addictive property of tobacco,” 42 U.S.C. § 290aa—2(b)(2); and make
States’ receipt of certain federal block grants contingent on their making
it unlawful “for any manufacturer, retailer, or distributor of tobacco
products to sell or distribute any such product to any individual under
the age of 18,” § 300x—26(a)(1).
Id.
238. Id. at 144 (“[O]n several occasions . . . and after the health consequences
of tobacco use and nicotine’s pharmacological effects had become well known,
Congress considered and rejected bills that would have granted the FDA such
jurisdiction.”).
239. Id. For the full recitation of the context of the regulatory scheme
surrounding tobacco, see the Court’s discussion on pages 143–159.
240. Id. at 133.
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questions doctrine. The issue in Burwell was whether the
ACA’s tax credits were available in states that had a Federal
Exchange.241 Prior to Burwell, the IRS issued a regulation
that made tax credits available on both State and Federal
Exchanges.242 Invoking the major questions doctrine, the
Court held that Chevron was wholly inapplicable, as it was
extremely unlikely that Congress had delegated such “a
question of deep ‘economic and political significance’ that is
central to this statutory scheme.”243
However, a straightforward Chevron Step Zero analysis
could have viably led to the conclusion that the IRS did not
have jurisdiction to address health care issues, and thus no
deference was warranted. Chevron Step Zero asks whether
the agency has the authority to issue binding legal rules.244
If the answer is no, Chevron does not apply.245 In Burwell,
the Court could have analyzed whether the IRS had the
authority to interpret the Section in question, 36B, which
was codified in Title 26 of the United States Code, the
Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”). What was necessary to
resolve the issue in Burwell was not simply a
straightforward interpretation of Section 36B, but the
interpretation of Section 36B in relation to the remainder of
the ACA, many of which parts lay outside of the IRC. To
illustrate: “Section 36B allows an individual to receive tax
credits only if the individual enrolls in an insurance plan
through ‘an Exchange established by the State under [42
U.S.C. § 18031].’”246 In addition, the Court also reviewed 42

241. King v. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2485 (2015).
242. Id. at 2487 (citing 77 Fed. Reg. 30378 (2012)).
243. Id. at 2489 (quoting Util. Air Regulatory Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324
(2014)).
244. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001).
245. Id. Though the agency may still receive Skidmore deference—an agency’s
statutory arguments are entitled to respectful consideration, given an agency’s
expertise about the statute it administers and the practical and technical issues
involved in implementing the law.
246. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. at 2489.

1130

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

U.S.C. § 18041 to inform the meaning of Section 36B.247
These two provisions are codified in Title 42 of the United
States Code, which is the United States Code dealing with
public health, social welfare, and civil rights.
Thus, the Court could have concluded, under Chevron
Step Zero, that the IRS did not have the authority to
interpret Section 36B. The Court even recognized in its
analysis that the IRS “has no expertise in crafting health
insurance policy of this sort.”248 But instead, the Court
refrained from engaging in a Chevron analysis, finding that
the major questions doctrine rendered Chevron inapplicable.
The argument can be made that the Court is now
substituting one doctrine (the major questions doctrine) for
another (traditional nondelegation doctrine) to deal with
what it believes are excessive delegations by Congress. In
doing so, the Court is increasing its own interpretive
authority at the cost of agency deference. This is especially
true when the Court could have restricted its analysis within
the existing Chevron framework, but chose not to. The major
questions doctrine acts more as a facade for the Court’s
separation of power effort to diminish administrative power.
This new approach centers around whether the Court
believes agency deference should exist as it currently does,
and can result in judicial decisions that are arbitrarily based
on the Court’s own policy judgments.249
CONCLUSION
One could take the view of the nondelegation argument
that Chevron violates the separation of powers as the
247. Id. at 2489 (“Although phrased as a requirement, the Act gives the States
‘flexibility’ by allowing them to ‘elect’ whether they want to establish an
Exchange. § 18041(b). If the State chooses not to do so, Section 18041 provides
that the Secretary ‘shall . . . establish and operate such Exchange within the
State.’ § 18041(c)(1) (emphasis added).”).
248. Id.
249. Heather Steiner, Food & (and) Drug Administration v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 28 ECOLOGY L. Q. 355, 356 (2001).
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Framers intended, because it allows Congress to
unconstitutionally delegate too much of its power to
executive agencies. Or, one could take the view of the
intelligible principle argument set out in Mistretta that “our
jurisprudence has been driven by a practical understanding
that in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever
changing and more technical problems, Congress simply
cannot do its job absent an ability to delegate power under
broad general directives.”250 Both views invoke a vision of the
Constitution. No matter which view one agrees with,
however, statutory ambiguity is unavoidable,251 and a
decision must be made as to what entity resolves that
ambiguity.
Both Justice Gorsuch and advocates of the major
questions doctrine believe that the Court should be the entity
to resolve the ambiguity—at the very least in cases that
present significant questions. But in setting out the
constitutional critique of Chevron, both Justice Gorsuch and
the major questions doctrine, as a manifestation of the same
criticism, offer a remedy that does not solve the problem of
which their critique complains. It appears that the Court is
now substituting the major questions doctrine for the
traditional nondelegation doctrine to deal with what it
believes are unconstitutional delegations by Congress. But
the delegation is not being restored to the legislature. The
result is a diminution of agency deference and an
enhancement of the Court’s interpretive role. This
development, coupled with the fact that a legitimate dispute
in the constitutional interpretation of Chevron exists,
demonstrates that what really underlies the arguments over
Chevron’s existence are policy disagreements over the proper
role of the current administrative state.

250. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989).
251. See Nicholas R. Bednar & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Inevitability, 85
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1392, 1448 (2017) (using as examples “what constitute[s] a
‘safe’ drug, a ‘reasonable hazard,’ . . . [or] a ‘crashworthy automobile.’”).

